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In this paper, we consider the problem of building a secure network against node conspiracy attack that based on
network segmentation. As we know, network coding has demonstrated its great application prospects in wireless
sensor network (WSN) transmission. At the same time, it is facing a variety of security threats, especially conspiracy
attack. In existing research, secure coding design strategies are much more than secure topological structure. In this
background, a weakly secure scheme is proposed from the perspective of topology and network segmentation.
Based on the network segmentation and topology design, the network coding transmission is weakly secure. We
conduct a simulation to show that the proposed scheme can efficiently prevent conspiracy attack.
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In 2003, Li [1] demonstrated that with a finite field size,
the maximum flow from the single source to sinks can
be achieved by linear network coding [2,3]. Based on this
theory, network coding technology, network coding has
demonstrated its great application prospects in both
wired networks and wireless networks. With large-scale
application of network coding, it faces a growing num-
ber of security issues.
There are many studies on the safety of network coding.
Based on secure models, it can be separated into two
groups in previous, Shannon secure and weakly secure.
The difference of these two classes is that Shannon secure
disallows any information leakage and weakly secure disal-
lows any meaningful information leakages. For example,
given two data streams x and y, based on weakly secure re-
quirements, the attacks allow to get the combination value
of x⊕ y, but not x or y alone, while in Shannon secure, the
attacks disallow learning neither of them. In this paper, we
focus on the weakly secure topological structure.
Based on the attack models, there are mainly two at-
tack models, polluting attacks (active attack) [4-8] and* Correspondence: durongorc@163.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pwiretapping attacks (passive attacks) [9-18]. In this paper,
we focus on wiretapping attacks, defined by Cai and
Yeung in [9] and proposed a multicast network coding
against wiretapping attacks in [10,11]. Feldman et al. [12]
proposed a coding scheme in small infinite field at the ex-
pense of a small amount of bandwidth. Chan [13] gave the
boundaries of the multicast capacity in secure network
coding. Bhattad and Narayanan [14] proposed a weakly se-
cure network coding system. On the basis of [14], Silva
[15] proposed a general weakly secure network coding sys-
tem. When the calculation ability of eavesdroppers is lim-
ited, Jain [16] designed a weakly secure networking system
using one-way function. In [17,18], the authors discussed
the security issues in the light of the different conditions
and different other safety requirements in wireless sensor
network (WSN). Fancsali et al. [19-21] did the corre-
sponding research and gave the respective security coding
system.
Most existing researches are mostly from a coding per-
spective with given topologies, which propose different
coding algorithms in different network environments, but
there is almost no research in secure topology design. Top-
ology design strategies do not need complicated encoding
and decoding process which save a lot of memory and
computing time. Topology design also has certain failure
rate, but when the cooperative eavesdroppers are relativelypen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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scheme reflects its advantage.
In view of the fact, the secure topology design is worthy
of study. In this paper, we propose a weakly secure network
topology algorithm based on topology design and network
segmentation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
We first discuss related work and the security goals we aim
to in Section 2. Then, we discuss the problem and present
an algorithm for secure network topology design and net-
work segmentation in Section 3. Finally, the results and
discussions are addressed in Section 4, and the paper is
concluded in Section 5.
2. Problem statement
In this section, we first summarize network coding and
then we introduce the system model. Finally, we introduce
the threat model and security goals to be used in this paper.
2.1 Network coding
Unlike traditional communication networks, network
coding is a new technique that allows intermediate nodes
to encode multiple input messages together to form mul-
tiple output messages. We can use the following example
to show how network coding can provide high transmis-
sion rate. Figure 1 is a classic example of network coding,
each link has unit capacity. Node W encodes the message
that is transmitted from W to X through a linear combin-
ation b1⨁ b2. Thus, the source S-transmitted two bit
streams b1 and b2 can multicast to the nodes Y and Z sim-
ultaneously; the transmission rate can achieve the multicast
rate of 2 bits per unit time.
2.2 System model
In this paper, a directed acyclic graph G = 〈V, E〉 is con-
sidered, where V and E are the node set and the edge
set, respectively. Cmin(G) is the minimum cut of G, and
the capacity Cmin(G) is the maximal possible informationa
Figure 1 Network coding. (a) Traditional network transmission. (b) Networate of network G. Each edge has one data stream unit per
time slot. The source node s generates and sends out an n
symbol message vector X = (x1, x2,…, xn)
T in a finite field
Fq. In linear coding systems, the messages on outgoing
edges of node vn are linear combinations of messages on
its incoming edges. It can be understood as that each edge
of the network carries an equation of source symbols.
2.3 Threat model and security goals
In wiretapping attack, the eavesdroppers are able to gain
access to the information transmitted on these nodes, sup-
pose the positions of malicious nodes are known. Also,
they can cooperate with each other to decode the packet
sent from the source S. Precisely, they can wiretap on a
collection of M = 〈M1,M2,…,MK〉, where M represents a
set of malicious nodes; accordingly, they can gain the data
stream carried by the incoming links of these malicious
nodes, suppose E = 〈E1, E2,…, EK〉 is the incoming link of
these malicious nodes. In this paper, we focus on weakly
secure. We disallow any meaningful information leakages
transmitted from the source node to the sink node.
3. Problem description and analysis
3.1 Related definitions
Assume CG(s, t) = k, for any intermediate node vi in G; if
the In (vi) is less than the capacity of the graph CG(s, d),
then for sufficiently large size q, the generated network
code is said to be secure with high probability, because
the intermediate node vi cannot recover any of the k
symbols based on k − 1 or fewer linear equations. On the
other hand, if CG ≤ |ln (vi)|, the security is said to be top-
ology dependent, and the network is considered secure
if and only if rank(in(vi)) <CG.
In [22], the sibling work of this paper, we analyzed
how the topology design influenced the security of net-
works, and we proposed a secure strategy against node
conspiracy attack by topology design. This method isb
rk coding transmission.
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large network, the wiretapping nodes become more, in-
creasing the number of links that needs to be removed.
Therefore, we propose a strategy of network coding against
wiretapping attack based on network segmentation.
3.2 Secure network segmentation algorithm
Figure 2 is a directed acyclic graph, and each link has a
unit capacity. The source node s wants to transmit some
information to the destination node t without leaking
meaningful information to the eavesdropper. Suppose
there are m malicious nodes, each node has n incoming
links CG(s, t) = k. We need to remove mn − k links to en-
sure the network security. If we divide the network into
two sub-networks, assuming that malicious nodes are
uniformly distributed, we just need to remove approxi-
mately mn−k=2 links to the network security.
In Figure 2, we randomly generate a 50-node network
diagram; after path enforcement, we get a directed graph
G(V, E). The entire network is divided into two sub-
networks G1(V1, E1) and G2(V2, E2) by the red line; the
dashed line is the link to be removed. C(G1) =C(G2) = 3,
any one of the sub-network is safe and leads the whole
network security.
How to find the best split routing is the problem that
we are mainly faced with, and we get two objective
functions.
We know that the min-cut sum of the two sub-networks
is no more than the min-cut of the whole network:
CG1 þ CG2≤CG ð1Þ
To ensure the throughput of the network, the divided
maximum flow is as close as possible to the original















Figure 2 Division chart of the network.We find the split routing and remove the dashed links;
the removed links are Ep1 . Then, we pick one sub-network,
with the algorithm of [22]; the removed links are Ep2 :
Ep ¼ Ep1 þ Ep2 : ð2Þ
The two objective functions are max CG1 þ CG2ð Þ and
min Ep. Such an algorithm is referred to as secure net-
work segmentation (SNS) algorithm.
3.3 An improved scheme based on the network
segmentation and topology design
In [22], we proposed a secure strategy against node con-
spiracy attack by topology design (ISTD). Here, we use
Figure 3 to describe the method generally.
We recommend a conception. As node i,
Case 1. in(i) = 1, out(i) = 1, the outgoing message is no
change with incoming message (shown in Figure 3a)
Case 2. in(i) = 1, out(i) > 1, the outgoing messages are lin-
ear correlation of incoming message (shown in Figure 3b)
Case 3. in(i) > 1, out(i) = 1, the outgoing message is
a combination of the incoming messages (shown in
Figure 3c)
Case 4. in(i) > 1, out(i) > 1, the outgoing messages are
not linear correlation of incoming messages. We can
mark these no linear correlation messages as Gi,j = (x1,
x2,…, xl)
N (shown in Figure 3d)
In Figure 4a, suppose nodes 3, 5, and 8 are malicious
nodes. Links {2→ 3, 9→ 3, 4→ 5, 10→ 5, 1→ 8, 7→ 8}
are polluted links. They carry the different messages (x, y)1,
z, (x, y, z)1, z, y, and x. Each data stream x, y, z appears
three times in these six polluted links. To satisfy the secur-
ity requirements, we need to remove three polluted links
















Figure 3 An example of link transformation. (a) in(i) = 1, out(i) = 1; (b) in(i) = 1, out(i) > 1, (c) in(i) > 1; out(i) = 1; and (d) in(i) > 1, out(i) > 1.
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needs to be removed. In Figure 4b, we do not remove any
polluted links. Instead, we remove {6→ 7} and re-create
the network topology; we will find that the topology is
already weakly secure. Eavesdroppers cannot get data
stream x, which means the data stream x of {2→ 3, 4→ 5,
7→ 8} comes from {6→ 7}; the sink node d receives data
stream x from another way. It tells us that if we can get
every data source of polluted links, we may find an ad-
vanced scheme to solve the security problem.
In Figure 4c, we mark the original network topology in
another way. Node 6 gets the data stream x from the
source node s and sends it to node 7 and node 11. We
define the source node is a parent node of node 6, and
node 7 and node 11 are child nodes of node 6. We mark
the data stream x carried by {6→ 7} and {6→ 11} as x1
and x2, node 7 gets the data stream from node 6 and
points to nodes 2 and 8, then the data stream carried by
{7→ 8} and {7→ 2} can be marked as x1.1 and x1.2; here,
xa,b,c,d⋯ represents different sources of data x. For node
5, it gets the data stream (x1,2, y2, z1)1 and z2,1.From the above transmission matrix G, polluted links
{2→ 3, 4→ 5} carry the data stream x1,2, {7→ 8} carries
the data stream x1,1, which both come from the data
stream x1, and the sink node d receives both x1 and x2.
Once link {6→ 7} is removed, the eavesdroppers cannot
get the data stream x, while the sink node d can get
complete information from the source node s.
It needs to be mentioned that the same data streams
need to be combined. For example, the data x1,2,3,4 and
x1,2,3,5 can be combined into x1,2,3, and the data x1,2,3,4
and x1,1,2,3 are combined into x1; the combination is to
find the maximum number of occurrences of the ori-
ginal data. In Figure 4, {5→ d} carries the data (x1,2, y2,
(z1, z2,1))1 where (z1, z2,1) means the data stream z comes
from both {9→ 3} and {9→ 10}, and it can be grouped
into z. The biggest features of the ISTD algorithm are
finding the sources of each polluted edges and removing
these relatively few source edges to make the network
secure.
Combining the two algorithms of SNS and ISTD, we
get an improved scheme based on topology design and(3)
Figure 4 Advanced scheme of transmission topology design with transmission rate of 3 in WSN system. (a) Network topology. (b) Secure
topology when nodes 3, 5, and 8 are malicious nodes. (c) Re-creation mark of network topology.
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into the following steps:
Step 1: Given a directed acyclic graph G = 〈V, E〉,
after path enforcement, suppose the positions of
malicious nodes are known, the minimum cut of Gis CG. V ′ ¼ v′1; v′2;…; v′m
 
is the set of malicious
nodes. E′ ¼ e′1; e′2;…; e′n
 
is the set of the incoming
edges of V′. We call it polluted edges.
Step 2: Mark all links of the network topology, fill the
transmission matrix G with the data stream X, and
combine the source of information flow.
Figure 5 Removed links Ep vs. p.
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message. We define E″ is the set of the remaining edges
which we called it polluted edges.
Step 4: Get a forward routing which contains the
polluted edges. The total number of the forward
routing cannot be more than the total polluted edges.
The forward routing is the split routing. The entire
network is divided into two sub-networks G1(V1, E1)
and G2(V2, E2). Suppose the split routing is Ep.
Step 5: We calculate the number of polluted links of the
two sub-networks E″1 and E
″
2. Suppose the less polluted
links is E″1. For safety requirements, all the links that need
to be removed is E″1 þ Ep.Figure 6 Removed links Ep vs. N.Step 6: Get the solution of the topology design and
network segmentation. The least links to be removed is
the optimal solution, if there is no such a topology that
satisfies the condition. Then, the message leakage is
unavoidable.
4. Simulation and discussion
4.1 The performance and discussion of SNS
In this section, simulations are conducted based on ns-2
simulator and MATLAB to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm. The network is defined by
these parameters, the number of nodes, N, (the number
of edges, Eall), the probability of malicious nodes in
Figure 8 Successful rate r vs. N.
Table 1 Performance comparison of coding design strategies and topology design strategies
Encoding and decoding cost Security Success rate
Coding design strategies o(h2) − o(h3) Shannon or weakly ≈1
Topology design strategies (ISNS) o(h) Weakly Wiretappers' rate
less than 0.1
Wiretappers' rate less than
0.2, more than 0.1
≈1 >0.9
Figure 7 Successful rate r vs. p.
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algorithm in [22] is the STD algorithm, and the SNS
algorithm is the basic scheme in this paper. For each
combination of parameters, we generate 50 instances.
In Figure 5, we set N = 50 and vary p in the range of
(0.1 − 0.3) to calculate Ep. In Figure 6, we set p = 0.2 and
vary N in the range of (30–70).
We can see from Figures 5 and 6 that, with the in-
crease of p and N, the SNS algorithm removes few links
than the STD algorithm. It improves the link utilization,
when faced with a large number of wiretapping nodes,
and performs particularly well. Compared to the STD
algorithm, the SNS algorithm in this paper has been
greatly improved, especially suitable for larger networks.
4.2 Improved SNS algorithm (ISNS)
STD is the proposed scheme in [22]. We proposed
an advanced scheme ISTD, relative to STD. ISTD was
greatly increased efficiently. In this paper, the ISTD
algorithm will be integrated into SNS. ISNS is the im-
proved scheme based on the network segmentation and
topology design. Compared with ISTD, the efficiency of
ISNS algorithm has been greatly improved. It removed less
polluted links; the small change of the transmission top-
ology improves the successful rate.
The network is defined by four parameters, the num-
ber of nodes, N, the probability of malicious nodes in
intermediate nodes, p, the largest degree of each node D
(the largest amount of incoming links), and the successful
rate of transmission r. For each combination of parameters,
we generate 50 instances.
In Figure 7, we set N = 50, D = 7 and vary p in the
range of (0.1 − 0.35) to calculate the r. In Figure 8, we
set p = 0.2, D = 7 and vary N in the range of (50–100) to
calculate the r. With the increase of p and N, the ISNS
algorithm performs better than ISTD. From the simula-
tion results, we can see that ISNS can cope with larger
structures and more malicious node network conspiracy
attack.
4.3 Performance comparison between coding design
strategies and topology design strategies
Compared with secure coding design strategies, the top-
ology design scheme has its own advantages and disad-
vantages. From the ISTD algorithm and ISNS algorithm,
we can see that topology design strategies do not need
complicated encoding and decoding processes; they use
linear network coding which save a lot of memory and
computing time. The proposed algorithm also has cer-
tain failure rate, but when the cooperative eavesdroppers
are relatively fewer (not more than 0.2) and the network
allows a certain error rate, the topology design scheme
reflects its advantage. In Table 1, we give the comparison
of coding design strategies and topology design strategies.It is especially suitable for the network with low percentage
of malicious nodes and allows certain error rate.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the topology design
and network segmentation issue for weakly secure against
node conspiracy attack. We analyzed how the network
segmentation and topology design influenced the security
of networks. We proposed a secure strategy against node
conspiracy attack by network segmentation and topology
design. We compared the ISTD and ISNS strategies. Sim-
ulations showed that the proposed routing algorithm ISNS
achieved good performance. It can cope with larger struc-
tures and more malicious node network than ISTD. As a
future research, we will study the secure topology design
strategy under a large number of malicious nodes and a
larger structure.
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